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Abstract 
 
We investigate whether a borrower’s media coverage influences the syndicated loan origination and 
participation decisions of informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures and 
interest spreads. In syndicated loan deals, information asymmetries can exist between lenders that 
have a relationship with a borrower and less informed, non-relationship lenders competing to serve 
as lead arranger on a syndicated loan, and also between lead arrangers and less informed syndicate 
participants. Theory suggests that the aggressiveness with which less informed lenders compete for 
a loan deal increases in the sentiment of public information signals about a borrower. We extend 
this theory to syndicated loans and hypothesize that the likelihood of less informed lenders serving 
as the lead arranger or joining a loan syndicate is increasing in the sentiment of media-initiated, 
borrower-specific articles published prior to loan origination. We find that as media sentiment 
increases (1) outside, non-relationship lenders have a higher probability of originating loans; (2) 
syndicate participants are less likely to have a previous relationship with the borrower or lead bank; 
(3) lead banks retain a lower percentage of loans and (4) loan spreads decrease. 
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1. Introduction 
The business press is an important source of public information about a firm. There is 
substantial evidence that the business press provides information about firm fundamentals to equity 
market participants incremental to that provided by other information intermediaries and by 
accounting data (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2008), and that it reduces information asymmetries between 
equity investors (e.g., Bushee et al., 2010). However, there is little research examining the role 
played by the media in private lending markets. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which 
media coverage of borrowers influences the loan origination and participation decisions of 
informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures and interest rate spreads.  
A defining feature of equity markets is that investors do not generally have privileged access to 
firms’ confidential information, as securities law prohibits unequal access to such information. This 
creates scope for the media to serve as an information intermediary for equity investors seeking 
information from sources external to the firm.1 In contrast, private debt markets are not subject to 
securities laws, allowing lenders significant access to borrowers’ private information as an integral 
part of the lending process. Syndicated loans involve multiple lenders where the degree of access to 
borrowers’ inside information can differ substantially across lenders. Such differential access to 
information creates information asymmetries between lenders at two levels.  
                                                          
1
 Bushee et al. (2010) define an information intermediary as an agent that provides information that is new 
and useful to other parties because it has either not been publicly released or widely disseminated.  
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First, syndicated lending involves information asymmetry between inside lenders with a prior 
relationship with a borrower and outside, non-relationship lenders competing for a mandate to 
serve as the lead arranger on a borrower’s loan.2 Non-relationship lenders are typically at an 
information disadvantage relative to relationship lenders. Through sustained engagement, 
relationship lead banks gain extensive inside knowledge of a borrower’s operations and develop 
private channels of communication with its managers. Borrowers are also inclined to reveal sensitive 
private information to relationship lenders (e.g., Greenbaum and Thakor, 1995, Boot, 2000, and 
Bharath et al., 2009).3 Second, information asymmetries exist between lead banks and other 
syndicate participants (we use the terms lead arranger and lead bank interchangeably). Although 
participants can  receive some private information from the lead bank or borrower, they are 
generally at an information disadvantage relative to the lead bank because they tend to maintain an 
arm’s length relationship with the borrower, while the lead bank has the primary due diligence and 
monitoring responsibilities (e.g., Lee and Mullineaux, 2004, Sufi, 2007, and Ivashina, 2009).  
Outside lenders, analogous to equity investors, have incentives to seek credit-relevant 
information about a borrower to mitigate their information disadvantage relative to more informed 
inside lenders.4 While media is unlikely to fully remove an inside lender’s private information 
advantage, it can reduce relative information asymmetries across lenders and influence loan 
                                                          
2
 A lead arranger establishes a relationship with the borrower and has primary responsibility for information 
collection, ex-ante due diligence, distributing shares of the loan to syndicate participants and ex-post 
monitoring, among other duties. The lead arranger receives a fee for arranging and managing the syndicated 
loan. We discuss institutional aspects of syndicated lending in more detail in section 2.1. 
3
 The idea that inside banks have an information advantage is well established in the literature (e.g., Kane and 
Malkiel, 1965, Fama, 1985, Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia, 1989, Sharpe, 1990, Rajan, 1992, Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994, 1995, and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). 
4
 For parsimony, we often refer to lead arrangers with a relationship to a borrower and participant banks with a 
relationship to the lead arranger or a borrower as inside lenders, and other lenders as outside lenders. The 
premise is that inside lenders are better informed than are outside lenders. 
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syndicate formation and pricing by transmitting credit relevant information to less informed lenders 
that is incremental to information received from other sources. We investigate the informational 
role of the media in syndicated lending by employing a quantitative measure of media sentiment in 
business press articles about a borrower. Using data from RavenPack News Analytics, we construct a 
measure that reflects the average sentiment across all full-size borrower-specific articles published 
over the six-month period preceding loan origination (Media Sentiment). RavenPack’s sentiment 
score reflects assessments of the tone of the news in a given article (i.e., positive or negative news) 
as well as the strength of the news the article contains.  
We first investigate if the media influences competition between inside and outside lenders 
for the mandate to serve as the lead arranger on a borrower’s loan. This analysis builds on the model 
from Rajan (1992) in which an informed (inside) bank in a current lending relationship with a risky 
borrower competes with less informed (outside) banks to supply new financing to a borrower. Inside 
banks exploit their information advantage by opportunistically bidding only for good loans while 
avoiding bad ones. Because inside banks avoid bad loans, outside lenders are exposed to adverse 
selection as they face a significant risk of loss if they bid. Outside lenders respond by moderating 
how aggressively they compete, becoming more reluctant to participate as their assessed probability 
that a loan is bad increases. Rajan (1992) further considers how public information signals about a 
borrower shape competitive dynamics, showing that outside lenders’ willingness to compete 
increases in the sentiment of the signal. A more favorable signal increases outside lenders’ 
assessment of loan quality, reducing their risk of getting stuck with a bad loan and increasing the 
aggressiveness with which they compete against an inside lender. In contrast, a less favorable signal 
decreases outside lenders’ willingness to compete due to heightened adverse selection concerns 
driven by lower assessed loan quality. The more (less) aggressively outsiders bid, the higher (lower) 
the probability is of their winning the loan deal. 
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We extrapolate this economic reasoning to syndicated loans where inside, relationship lenders 
and outside, non-relationship lenders compete to be selected by a borrower as the lead arranger of 
the syndication. We empirically investigate whether media sentiment is associated with the 
probability that the lead arranger of a loan is an outside lender with no established relationship with 
a borrower. We hypothesize that the aggressiveness with which outside lenders compete to arrange 
a loan is increasing in media sentiment, thus raising their probability of winning the loan. We find 
that the probability of a non-relationship lender serving as a lead arranger is higher when media 
sentiment is more positive. A one standard deviation increase in media sentiment increases the 
probability that a loan is syndicated by a non-relationship lead arranger by 6.2%. 
We next consider whether the media influences the willingness of lenders to participate in a 
loan syndicate. We classify as more informed, inside participants those lenders who have a previous 
relationship with either the borrower or the loan’s lead arranger (e.g., Sufi, 2007, and Ivashina, 
2009), and as less informed outside participants those without a relationship. We hypothesize that 
the willingness of less informed lenders to participate in a loan syndicate is increasing in media 
sentiment. Because a lead arranger has an information advantage relative to syndicate participants 
and its monitoring effort after a loan closes is unobservable, participants face both adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems (e.g., Sufi, 2007, Ivashina, 2009, and Mora, 2015).  While it is difficult to 
empirically distinguish adverse selection and moral hazard, we argue that the media can influence 
lenders’ participation through either channel.  
To motivate an adverse selection explanation, we extend the economic reasoning from Rajan 
(1992) to loan syndicates where loan participants compete to become syndicate members. In 
forming a syndicate, a lead bank sends out invitations to a large set of potential lenders who choose 
whether or not to bid on joining the syndicate. The number of invitations generally exceeds the 
number of lenders who ultimately participate (Champagne and Kryzanowski, 2007). As noted by 
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Ivashina and Sun (2011), the syndication process can be viewed as an auction where loan 
participants submit sealed bids to the lead arranger. The same winner’s curse issue developed in 
Rajan (1992) plausibly operates here to the extent that inside participants pursue good loans, leaving 
bad loans to less informed bidders. Analogous to Rajan (1992), the media can influence the severity 
of the winner’s curse problem, where more positive media signals increase the willingness of non-
relationship (less informed) lenders to bid for loan participation.  
Under moral hazard, syndicate participants are concerned about ex-post monitoring efforts of 
the lead arranger, where monitoring becomes more crucial for troubled borrowers (Sufi, 2007). If 
the media reveals negative news, outside participants plausibly downgrade their assessment of loan 
quality, which increases their concern about the lead arranger shirking. Thus, outside participants 
are less likely to join a syndicate than are relationship participants with superior information about 
the lead arranger and/or the borrower. Similar to the adverse selection case, outside lenders can 
either not submit bids or submit bids that are rejected by the lead arranger in favor of superior bids 
by relationship participants. Based on these arguments, we predict that the probability of non-
relationship syndicate participants joining the syndicate increases in media sentiment. We find 
evidence consistent with this prediction: a one standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment 
increases the probability that a participant without a prior relationship with the borrower (lead 
arranger) joins the syndicate by 7.1% (9.3%).   
Next, we examine the proportion of a loan retained by the lead bank. Due to adverse 
selection and moral hazard concerns, syndicate participants require lead arrangers to put 
skin in the game by holding a proportion of the loan that is increasing in the severity of the 
agency problem (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997, and Sufi, 2007). 
Because, as argued above, more positive public signals are expected to decrease both 
adverse selection and moral hazard risks faced by less informed syndicate participants, we 
  
 
 
6 
hypothesize that the loan share retained by the lead arranger is decreasing in media 
sentiment. We show that a one standard deviation increase in media sentiment decreases 
this proportion by 5.3%. 
Finally, we investigate whether more positive media sentiment is associated with lower 
interest rate spreads. We hypothesize that if, as argued earlier, loan attractiveness to non-
relationship lead arrangers and syndicate participants increases when media sentiment is more 
positive, the expanded set of potential lenders willing to fund the loan will increase the supply of 
credit available to the borrower and put downward pressure on interest spreads. We find that 
interest rate spreads are decreasing in media sentiment: a one standard deviation increase in Media 
Sentiment translates into a 6.9 basis point decrease in the spread.   
Our previous analyses presume that the media provides new information to less informed 
lenders by publicly revealing either private information known to inside, but not outside, lenders, or 
information that is not previously known to either inside or outside lenders. To bolster this claim, we 
show that our findings with respect to lead arranger choice, syndicate participation, lead arranger 
share, and interest spreads are robust to controlling for alternative public information sources, 
including equity analysts, credit rating agencies, and firm-initiated press releases. Further, we split 
our sample into partitions based on the extent of firms’ analyst coverage. Prior research shows that 
analysts provide useful information to lenders (e.g., Guntay and Hackbarth, 2010, and Mansi et al., 
2011). This suggests that when analyst information is scarce, lenders face more uncertainty about a 
borrower’s prospects and rely more on alternative information sources. We predict that if the media 
is informative to outside lenders, then the effect of media sentiment on private lending practices will 
be stronger when analyst coverage is less intensive. Consistently, we find that syndicate structure 
and loan spreads are more sensitive to media sentiment when analyst coverage is lower. We further 
find some evidence that the effect of media sentiment is stronger for borrowers that experience an 
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exogenous reduction in analyst coverage preceding loan issuance.  
Although our findings are consistent with the media providing incremental information to 
outside lenders, the media can also influence private lending deals through alternative channels. We 
explore one such channel by examining the possibility that the media influences consumers’ 
perceptions of a borrower, changing their future purchasing decisions and consequently a 
borrower’s future cash flows. For example, news that a consumer-product firm acted irresponsibly 
towards the environment may cause some consumers to abandon the firm’s products. It is plausible 
that lenders would incorporate the expected impact of changes in consumer behavior on a 
borrower’s future sales and cash flows into loan pricing. We thus hypothesis that the media, 
operating through a consumer perception channel, impacts the interest spreads of consumer-
product-oriented borrowers more intensively than it does the spreads of other borrowers. We find 
strong supporting evidence. This evidence suggests that the media can affect loan pricing via at least 
two channels – by informing outside lenders with limited access to private information and by 
changing consumers’ perception of the borrower, which is in turn priced by lenders.  
While our analyses provide robust evidence consistent with the media being a direct source of 
information to lenders, we cannot fully rule out the possibility that media sentiment proxies for 
information from other sources. However, whether the media is a direct source of information or 
simply mimics information from other sources, our results contribute to the literature by providing 
substantive evidence on the role of information signal sentiment in shaping loan deals. The evidence 
that lenders’ decisions are influenced by media sentiment is consistent with the theory of Rajan 
(1992) and differentiates our analysis from prior studies that focus primarily on the availability of 
public information about a borrower without considering the role of its sentiment (e.g., Sufi, 2007, 
Ball et al., 2008, Ivashina, 2009 and Schenone, 2010). We extend the literature by demonstrating 
that critical aspects of syndicate lending, such as lead arranger choice, syndicate participation 
  
 
 
8 
decisions, the loan share retained by the lead arranger and loan pricing are significantly associated 
with the sentiment of business press articles, controlling for alternative information sources about 
the borrower. We also provide novel evidence consistent with media sentiment impacting loan 
pricing via its influence on consumer perceptions and behavior. 
Section 2 presents prior research that motivates our analyses and the hypotheses 
development. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 reports our main results and 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Motivation and Related Literature  
2.1. Information asymmetry between lenders competing to serve as a lead arranger  
Private debt contracts rely on the flow of confidential information between lenders and 
borrowers (e.g., Diamond, 1984, and Fama 1985). Confidential information includes hard 
information, such as timely financial disclosures, covenant compliance information, amendment and 
waiver requests, financial projections, and plans for acquisitions or dispositions (Standard and 
Poor’s, 2011), as well as softer information, such as observations about a management team’s 
abilities, and honesty (Petersen, 2004). Lenders with access to borrowers’ confidential information 
are surely less reliant on public information than are equity investors. However, not all lenders have 
equivalent access to a borrower’s private information, and information asymmetries across lenders 
create a demand from informationally disadvantaged lenders for public information.  
A syndicated loan is a loan issued to a firm jointly by more than one financial institution. 
Members of a syndicate can be classified as either lead arrangers or participant lenders. The lead 
arranger initiates a loan, negotiates with a borrower, and then syndicates shares of the loan to 
participant lenders. The lead arranger’s compensation consists of an upfront fee not shared with the 
rest of the syndicate and interest spread (Ivashina, 2009). This upfront fee increases with the 
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complexity and riskiness of the loan (Standard and Poors, 2011). Lead arrangers also get private 
benefits from building a relationship with the borrower and gaining access to its future business 
(Yasuda, 2005, Drucker and Puri, 2005, and Mora, 2015).  Before any loan participants are invited to 
join a syndicate, the borrower first selects the lead arranger from the set of competing lenders. 
Information asymmetry can affect the competition among lenders competing for a mandate to serve 
as the lead arranger on a loan. Here we must distinguish inside lenders with a prior relationship with 
a borrower and outside, non-relationship lenders.  
Relationship lenders interact repeatedly with borrowers over an extended time period, and in 
the process gain extensive inside knowledge of the borrowers’ operations and develop private 
channels of communication with managers. Due to this information advantage, relationships are an 
important source of an incumbent bank’s comparative advantage over new lenders without a 
relationship (Boot, 2000). Thus, when lenders compete to serve as lead arranger, outside, non-
relationship lenders face adverse selection risk due to their pre-bidding information disadvantage. 
This adverse selection issue is the focus of Rajan (1992).  
Rajan models competitive dynamics in private lending markets in a setting where a 
relationship bank competes for a borrower’s loan with less informed (outside) banks. The premise is 
that the inside bank acquires private information through its privileged access to the borrower, while 
an outside bank lacks access. The model assumes that the inside bank knows for sure whether the 
firm will succeed or fail, while an outside bank has an assessed probability of success.5 Under these 
conditions, an outside bank is at a disadvantage in bidding against the inside lender. The outside 
bank understands that if it adopts an aggressive strategy of always bidding, the inside bank will 
exploit this predictability and always win good loans by offering the borrower slightly better terms 
                                                          
5
 Hauswald and Marquez (2006) demonstrate similar economic consequences of relationship lending in a 
model where inside banks are imperfectly, but better, informed than are outside banks.  
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than does the outsider in the good state (when the firm will succeed) and leaving outside lenders 
with bad loans by not bidding in the bad state (when the firm will fail). This exposes the outsider to a 
winner’s curse problem in which it only finances bad projects.  
To deal with this problem, an outside lender plays a mixed strategy in which it randomizes 
bidding and not bidding. This implies that with some probability, the outside lender will not 
participate in the bidding process. Rajan (1992) shows that outsiders bid less frequently as their 
assessed probability that a loan is bad increases. Taking as given the outsider’s mixed strategy, the 
insider’s equilibrium strategy is to bid for good loans, but not for bad. For good loans, the insider 
offers a higher interest rate than outsiders do, knowing that when the outsider does not bid, the 
insider will win the loan and earn high profits, but lose the loan and earn zero profits if the outsider 
bids. In an important extension, Rajan (1992) shows that public disclosure influences outside 
lenders’ probability of bidding by changing their assessments of loan quality. While a more positive 
signal increases outside lenders’ assessments of loan quality, a more negative signal increases the 
adverse selection problem outside lenders face.  
This leads to the result that the probability of an outsider bidding for a loan is higher for 
signals with higher sentiment.6 Further, the greater the probability of outsiders’ bidding, the higher 
their probability is of winning the loan. Building on this intuition, we hypothesize that the probability 
of an outside, non-relationship lender serving as the lead arranger of a syndicated loan is increasing 
in media sentiment. Following Schenone (2010), we classify a loan as syndicated by a relationship 
lead arranger if the lender has syndicated a majority of the borrower’s prior loan deals by volume 
                                                          
6
 While Rajan’s (1992) model is analyzed in terms of only a good and bad signal, it is straightforward to 
generalize this result to a setting with more than two signals. What is required is that the Monotone Likelihood 
Ratio Property holds such that higher signals indicate a higher likelihood that the loan is good (Rajan’s two 
signal model implicitly assumes MLRP). In this case, higher signals result in a greater probability of bidding. In 
the language of our paper, the probability of an outsider bidding for a loan monotonically increases in the 
sentiment of the information signal. 
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over the five year period preceding the loan issuance date, and syndicated by a non-relationship 
lender otherwise. We construct a media sentiment variable using the RavenPack database to proxy 
for the sentiment of public information signals in Rajan (1992).  
While Rajan (1992) describes well competition among differentially informed lenders to win a 
loan deal, the model does not directly consider information asymmetry issues associated with loan 
syndicate formation. We turn to this issue next. 
2.2. Information asymmetry within loan syndicates  
We examine whether the media influences the willingness of lenders to participate as 
members in a loan syndicate.  Participant lenders generally do not directly communicate with the 
borrower and maintain an arm’s length relationship through the lead arranger. The lead arranger 
establishes and maintains a relationship with the borrower and acts as an agent for the syndicate by 
collecting and processing information about the borrower. Prior to syndication, the lead bank 
conducts due diligence and presents an assessment of the borrower's quality to potential 
participants. Thus, participants face adverse selection risk because the lead bank can have an 
incentive to syndicate low quality loans (Sufi, 2007, and Ivashina, 2009). Lead banks can, for 
example, originate and then syndicate low quality loans to obtain upfront fees and capture private 
benefits, such as future cross-selling opportunities with the borrower (Mora, 2015). After 
syndication, the lead bank is charged with monitoring the borrower. This introduces a moral hazard 
risk as lead banks only retain part of the loan, which reduces incentives to monitor.  
Most research on syndicate lending does not distinguish between the moral hazard and 
adverse selection risks (e.g., Ball et al., 2008, Ivashina, 2009, Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000, Jones et 
al., 2005). Empirically separating these two risks is challenging, as the consequences of moral hazard 
and adverse selection are generally observationally equivalent (Cohen and Siegelman, 2009). 
Although we do not attempt to distinguish between the two, we expect the media to influence 
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lenders’ participation through either an adverse selection or moral hazard channel.  
The syndication process seeks to match borrowers with the set of lenders that value the 
loan most highly. To form a syndicate, a lead bank sends out invitations to a large set of potential 
lenders who choose whether to submit bids to join the syndicate. Invitations to bid generally 
outnumber acceptances, implying that many invitees choose not to participate (Champagne and 
Kryzanowski, 2007).7  Lenders that accept the invitation submit sealed bids directly to the lead bank. 
After bids are in, a minimum clearing spread is determined and investors who bid that spread or 
below are awarded a share of the loan on a pro-rata basis (Ivashina and Sun, 2011).  
We extend the adverse selection dynamics reasoning from Rajan (1992) to competition 
among differentially informed lenders to become syndicate members. We posit that 
participants with a prior relationship with either the borrower or the lead arranger face less 
severe information risks than participants without a relationship. Thus, the winner’s curse 
issue developed in Rajan (1992) is likely to play a role in lenders' syndicate participation 
decisions to the extent that inside participants pursue good loans, leaving bad loans for less 
informed bidders. In line with Rajan (1992), the media can influence the severity of the 
winner’s curse problem, where more positive media signals increase the willingness of non-
relationship lenders to bid for loan participation. Note that outside lenders that do not join the 
syndicate can either not submit bids or submit bids that are rejected by the lead arranger in 
favor of superior bids by relationship participants.  
With respect to moral hazard, because the severity of potential losses due to a lack of 
                                                          
7 Sample loans have on average 9.6 syndicate participants. Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007) note that the 
number of invitations sent to potential syndicate participants is generally 3 times the number of participants 
that agree to join the syndicate, although this is likely to vary with the tightness of the supply of credit, the 
loan’s purpose and the complexity of its structure, as well as future cross-selling possibilities, among other 
things.  
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monitoring effort is likely to be higher for troubled borrowers (Sufi, 2007), negative media news can 
lower outside participants’ assessments of loan quality and thus increase their concerns about lead 
arranger shirking. This can in turn increase the information disadvantage of non-relationship 
participants relative to relationship participants who possess enhanced channels of communication 
with the borrower or lead arranger. Thus, outside participants can be less willing to bid against 
relationship lenders or they can demand terms that are less favorable than those sought by 
relationship participants and therefore are rejected by the lead arranger. Based on these arguments, 
we hypothesize that the probability of non-relationship syndicate participants joining the syndicate 
increases in media sentiment also through the moral hazard channel. 
We further examine the effect of the media on information asymmetry within syndicates by 
investigating whether media sentiment is associated with the proportion of the loan retained by the 
lead bank. Theory posits that a key mechanism for resolving information asymmetry issues and 
securing potential syndicate lenders willing to join the loan syndicate is to require lead banks to have 
skin in the game by holding a stake in the loan that increases in the severity of agency problems (e.g., 
Leland and Pyle, 1977, Diamond, 1984, and Holmström and Tirole, 1997). Empirical research 
provides evidence consistent with the theory. Sufi (2007) shows that lead banks hold a larger share 
of the loan when borrowers are more opaque, while Ball et al. (2008) show that the share retained 
by lead banks is decreasing in the debt contracting value of the borrower’s accounting numbers. We 
extend and innovate on this literature by conjecturing that the share retained by the lead arranger 
depends not only on the fact that there is public disclosure, but also on the sentiment the disclosure 
conveys. Because, as argued earlier, a more positive public signal decreases adverse selection and 
moral hazard risk, we predict that the loan share retained by the lead arranger is decreasing in 
media sentiment.   
2.3. Media sentiment and loan pricing  
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 We next address whether media sentiment affects the interest rates.  Rajan (1992)  
shows that more positive disclosure increases the aggressiveness of outside lenders in 
bidding for a loan, which decreases the rents that inside lenders can extract from borrowers 
and thus results in lower interest rates. Recent empirical research exploits changes in a 
firm’s information environment to identify how the information advantage of inside banks 
affects loan pricing. Hale and Santos (2009) examine how loan pricing changes following 
bond IPOs. They predict that when public information released during the IPO process 
reveals positive news about a borrower – that it is creditworthy – it increases outside banks’ 
willingness to bid on its loans and consequently reduces inside lenders’ information 
advantage. Consistently, they find that firms revealed as having investment grade credit 
ratings pay lower spreads on their loans after they undertake a bond IPO.    
Hale and Santos (2009) rely on a significant information event to identify how public 
disclosure reduces inside banks’ ability to extract rents from borrowers. We complement 
Hale and Santos (2009) by examining whether more favorable media sentiment results in 
lower spreads. In a syndicated loan setting, we expect more favorable media sentiment to 
increase both the aggressiveness with which outside lenders bid to arrange loans and to 
participate in loan syndicates, thus expanding the set of lenders willing to fund the loan. This 
expansion of potential lenders should increase the supply of credit available to the 
borrower. To the extent that interest spreads are negatively associated with the supply of 
credit (e.g., Ivashina and Sun, 2011), we predict that the wider range of syndicate 
participants and arrangers associated with more positive media sentiment results in lower 
loan pricing.   
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2.4. The role of the business press in capital markets 
The main premise of our paper is that the business press plays an important role in the private 
lending market by mitigating information asymmetries between differentially informed lenders. 
While there has been little research to date on this topic, a growing body of research demonstrates a 
substantive role played by the business press in the equity market. Although the information 
structures and contractual features of private lending differ from those of the equity markets, prior 
research supports the plausibility of our premise that the media can be informative to less informed 
outside lenders and influence their behavior.  
Miller (2006) finds that the press serves as a watchdog for accounting fraud by rebroadcasting 
information from other information intermediaries and by undertaking original investigations that 
provide new information to the markets. Several papers find that media articles pressure firms to 
alter governance structures and strategic decisions, such as resource allocation, environmental 
policies and the structure of executive compensation (e,g.,  Dyck and Zingales,  2002,  Bednar et al., 
2012, Kuhnen and Niessen, 2012).8 For lenders without privileged access to a borrower, media 
articles that reveal fraud or pressure firms to alter governance and strategic choices can plausibly 
convey new information about the integrity of a borrower’s executives, litigation risk, or changes in 
managerial incentives. These are important aspects of a lender’s assessment of a borrower’s future 
prospects and creditworthiness.   
Further, there is evidence that the business press provides information about firm 
fundamentals to equity market participants over and above that provided by other information 
intermediaries and accounting data (e.g., Bushee et al., 2010, and Fang and Peress, 2009). Tetlock et 
al. (2008) finds that the fraction of negative words in firm-specific news stories forecasts low firm 
                                                          
8
 See Miller and Skinner (2015) for a more detailed discussion of the media literature.  
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earnings and that equity prices quickly respond to the information in negative words. They suggest 
that linguistic media sentiment captures otherwise hard-to-quantify aspects of firms’ fundamentals.9 
It is thus plausible that the media can also impact private lending by providing information on hard-
to-quantify aspects of firms’ fundamentals that underpin credit quality. Lenders’ assessments of 
firms’ credit risk can be affected by information about products, customers, competitors, industry 
growth potential, top executive teams, governance, regulation, legal issues, strategic plans, 
acquisitions, and labor markets, among many other topics (Green et al., 2012). The information 
revealed by the media can be new information not available to lenders from other sources, or it 
could be a signal that confirms, corroborates, or substantiates noisy information that lenders 
received from a different source. In the latter case, the media could, for example, confirm soft 
information the lender obtained elsewhere about the borrower, or allow the lender to filter noise 
from signals received from other sources. While our research design does not allow to distinguish 
the specific topics covered in the media articles underpinning media sentiment measure, extant 
research shows the power of a computational linguistics approach to quantify the language of a 
wide swath of firms’ media coverage rather than focusing on specific categories of news. As noted 
by Tetlock et al. (2008), by quantifying language, researchers can examine the directional impact of a 
wide variety of events, rather than focusing on particular event types. 
In addition to providing direct information to lenders about a borrower, the media can 
indirectly influence private lending deals by changing a borrower’s circumstances through its impact 
on the behavior of a borrower’s stakeholders. We explore one such channel by examining the 
possibility that the media influences consumers’ perceptions of a borrower, changing their future 
                                                          
9
 See also Kothari et al. (2009), Boudoukh et al. (2012) and Rogers et al. (2016). In contrast, a number of recent 
papers suggest that media coverage might exacerbate information asymmetry and inefficient trading behavior 
(e.g., Frankel and Li, 2004, Green et al., 2012, and Soltes et al., 2014).  
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purchasing decisions and consequently a borrower’s future cash flows. 10 The idea is that lenders 
would incorporate the expected consequences of these changes into the loan terms offered to the 
borrower.  
3. Sample, Data and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1. Data sources and sample selection 
We employ the DealScan database provided by the Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation 
(TRLPC) to obtain loan-specific characteristics. Media sentiment scores are from RavenPack News 
Analytics, which covers all news disseminated via Dow Jones Newswires. RavenPack employs a 
variety of advanced textual analysis techniques to create news sentiment scores for business news 
stories. We obtain firm characteristics from Compustat. Firms’ senior debt ratings, watchlist and 
outlook data (at the firm level) are retrieved from the S&P historical database. For borrowers with 
no rating data in the S&P database, we collect the S&P, Moody’s and Fitch ratings from the Internet-
based version of TRLPC. 
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. For the period from 2000 to 2012, DealScan 
reports 31,974 facilities issued to U.S. public firms in U.S. dollars. This time period reflects the 
availability of media data from RavenPack. Merging this sample with RavenPack leaves us with 
24,308 facilities. Next, we exclude facilities with insufficient loan data, reducing the sample to 12,397 
facilities. We also require borrowers to have sufficient Compustat data to estimate borrower 
characteristics and sufficient RavenPack data to estimate media sentiment prior to loan issuance. 
We estimate borrower characteristics in the quarter prior to the loan issuance and media sentiment 
                                                          
10
 Previous literature provides evidence that consumer behavior is sensitive to perceptions of a firm. For 
example, Lev et al. (2009) find that charitable contributions are significantly positively associated with future 
revenue, particularly for consumer-product-oriented firms. Similarly, Fisman et al. (2006) find that corporate 
philanthropy and profits are positively related, but only for firms in industries where a firm’s image is 
important to consumers. 
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over the 180 days prior to the loan issuance.11 We limit media data to full-size articles, excluding 
news flashes (news articles composed only of a headline and no body text), news articles composed 
of a headline and mostly tabular data, and firm-initiated press releases. We further restrict our 
sample to full-size articles with a relevance score of 75 and above. The relevance score is assigned by 
RavenPack to indicate when the firm is strongly related to the underlying news story. The scores 
range from 0 (low relevance) to 100 (high relevance). Our final sample contains 7,244 facilities 
related to 2,031 firms.  
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our tests (all variables are 
described in detail in Appendix A). Media Sentiment is estimated as the average news sentiment 
over the 180 days prior to a loan’s origination date. We utilize RavenPack’s Composite Sentiment 
Score (CSS), which represents the news sentiment of a given story by combining various textual 
analysis techniques (see Appendix A for a more detailed description of RavenPack’s CSS measure). 
CSS scores range between 0 to 100, with a score above 50 indicating positive news; a score equal to 
50, neutral news; and a score below 50, negative news. We apply a linear transformation to the CSS 
score and define Media Sentiment = (CSS-50)/50, so that the Media Sentiment ranges from -1 to 1, 
with zero being equivalent to neutral sentiment. The mean (median) value of Media Sentiment is -
0.0046 (0.0000). 
We examine five primary loan characteristics. Our first measure reflects the previous 
relationship of the lead arranger and the borrower. The mean value of Borr-Lead No-Relationship 
indicates that 63.8% of loans are issued by non-relationship lead arrangers. The next two measures 
                                                          
11 We focus on the 180 days prior to the loan issuance to allow a sufficient time period prior to the start of the 
syndication process, which typically takes around 3 months. Our findings and inferences do not change if we 
estimate media coverage over 90 or 60 days prior to the loan issuance.  
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are concerned with the previous relationships of the syndicate participants. Sample loan syndicates 
have on average 9.6 syndicate participants, indicating relatively large syndicates. The interquartile 
range of the number of participants is 11, which suggests a high variation in syndicate structure for 
sample loans (untabulated). The mean value of Part-Borr No-Relationship indicates that 56.75% of 
syndicate participants have not participated in a borrower’s syndicated loans in the five years 
preceding a loan’s issuance. The mean value of Part-Lead No-Relationship indicates that 15.25% of 
syndicate participants have not participated in syndicates arranged by the loan’s lead arranger in the 
five years preceding the loan’s issuance. We also examine the proportion of a loan retained by the 
lead arranger. For loans with sufficient data, the mean (median) value of Lead Share is 21.05% 
(13.38%). With respect to loan pricing, the average interest rate spread is 159.5 basis points (Spread 
is the logarithm of the interest spread). 
With respect to sample firm characteristics, the average ratio of earnings before extraordinary 
items to total assets (ROA) is 0.85%. Sample firms have an average interest coverage ratio (Interest 
coverage) of 10.51, and average Leverage, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, of 
0.25. Sample firms are also relatively large, with a mean value of total assets of $1,411M (Size is 
measured by the logarithm of the total assets). An average Altman’s (1968) bankruptcy score (Z-
score) is 2.24 (a higher score indicates a lower credit risk). The average market-to-book ratio is 3.01. 
14.76% of the sample observations relate to the borrowers experiencing losses.  
We report statistics for loan characteristics that serve as controls. Sample loans have an 
average size of $167.0M (Amount is the logarithm of loan amount) and a maturity (Maturity) of 47.9 
months. The majority of the loans are revolvers (62.3 percent) and 10 percent are term loans B and 
below, which are typically issued to non-bank institutional investors. 71.4 percent of the sample 
loans have performance pricing provisions (PP), 63.9 percent are secured (Collateral) and loans have 
on average 2.3 financial covenants (#Covenants).  
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Finally, we provide statistics for three alternative sources of information about borrowers. 
First, we estimate the sentiment of all borrower-initiated press releases over the 180 days prior to a 
loan’s origination date. To isolate firm-initiated press releases, we impose a more stringent 
relevance criterion than the one applied to media articles and require a relevance score of 90 or 
greater. Press releases with a relevance score above 75 and below 90 often relate to cases where 
the firm is mentioned in the press releases of other firms. We apply a linear transformation to the 
CSS score and define Press Release Sentiment = (CSS-50)/50, so that Press Release Sentiment ranges 
from -1 to 1, with zero being equivalent to neutral sentiment. Press release sentiment is typically 
positive, with a mean (median) value for Press Release Sentiment of 0.0243 (0.0264). Second, we 
report on whether the borrower is rated by a credit rating agency. 56% of sample loans are issued to 
rated borrowers. Third, because prior research suggests that equity analysts are informative to 
lenders (e.g., Guntay and Hackbarth, 2010, and Mansi et al., 2010), we measure whether a borrower 
has equity analyst coverage at loan origination. 87.5% of sample loans are issued to borrowers with 
analyst coverage. 
To reflect additional information available about a borrower, we also estimate its abnormal 
stock returns over the same period during which sentiment is measured. Sample firms experience 
mean (median) abnormal returns of 5.6% (2.2%) over the 180 days prior to a loan’s issuance 
(Return), with 42.75% of firms having a negative return over this period (Negative Return). 
4. Empirical Results 
We organize the discussion of our empirical findings into five subsections. Section 4.1 
provides evidence on the association between media sentiment and the probability of a non-
relationship bank leading the loan deal. Section 4.2 examines relations between media sentiment 
and syndicate structure and section 4.3 considers those between media sentiment and loan pricing. 
In section 4.4, we provide evidence consistent with the media being a direct source of information to 
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less informed, outside lenders. Finally, in section 4.5 we examine an additional channel through 
which the media may affect loan pricing.  
4.1. Media sentiment and the probability of a non-relationship bank leading the loan deal 
In this section, we examine whether media sentiment is positively associated with the 
probability of outside, non-relationship lenders serving as a lead arranger. We predict that a more 
positive media sentiment is associated with a higher probability that a lender without an established 
relationship with the borrower originates the loan. We estimate the following logistic model: 
        
0 1 2
3 ,
Borr-Lead No-Relationship= Media Sentiment Controls
Alternative Info Sources
  

 

           (1) 
where Borr-Lead No-Relationship is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a loan is issued by a non-
relationship lender, and zero otherwise.12 Media Sentiment is our main variable of interest; we 
predict that 1 > 0.  
We control for a number of factors that prior research suggests are associated with the 
probability of a non-relationship lead arranger syndicating the loan (e.g., Gopalan et al., 2011, and 
Bolton et al., 2013), including whether a firm’s previous loan is still outstanding when the current 
loan is issued (Outstanding), the time between the current and previous loan (Time Between) and 
the tightness of the credit supply in the economy (Tight Credit Supply). We proxy for credit supply 
tightness using changes in bank lending standards for mid-sized and large commercial loans, as 
reported in the Federal Reserve Board’s quarterly Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank 
Lending Practices (e.g., Bassett et al., 2012). The Tight Credit Supply variable takes a value of 1 if the 
change in lending standards in the quarter of a loan’s origination is in the top quartile of the 
                                                          
12 To be able to measure this relationship variable, we restrict the estimation of model (1) to the sample of 
borrowers who issued at least one loan over the five-year period prior to a current loan’s origination date. 
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sample’s distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
We also control for a borrower’s characteristics that reflect its creditworthiness, including 
profitability (ROA), interest coverage ratio (Interest Coverage), leverage (Leverage), size of total 
assets (Size), z-score (Z-score), the market-to-book ratio (MTB), and an indicator variable reflecting 
whether the borrower has experienced losses (Loss). In terms of loan-specific characteristics, we 
control for loan size (Amount), maturity (Maturity), whether the loan is a revolving line of credit 
(Revolver) and if the loan is a term loan B and below (Term Loan B). 
Finally, we control for alternative information sources about the borrower, including its press 
release sentiment (Press Release Sentiment), whether it is rated (Rated) and whether it has analysts’ 
coverage (Analyst Coverage).13 To reflect borrower-related news not captured by additional 
information sources and firm controls, we also include a borrower’s abnormal stock returns (Return) 
and an indicator variable reflecting whether stock returns are negative (Negative Return), measured 
contemporaneously with Media Sentiment. Although stock returns impound all available 
information, there is still scope for Media Sentiment to play a direct role in informing lenders. The 
idea here is that the weights placed on the available information signals are tailored to the specific 
decision context at hand. While stock prices optimally aggregate all available information for 
valuation purposes, the weights on information signals that are optimal for valuing equity may not 
be optimal for assessing credit quality. Because a bank cannot generally look at changes in share 
price and extract the relevant signal from the many factors that move share price, outside banks can 
utilize relevant information from media stories and weight them appropriately in their credit 
decisions (Paul, 1992, Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993).14 Finally, we cluster the standard errors at the 
                                                          
13
 In the Online Appendix, we show that our results are robust to including a more extensive set of measures of 
alternative information sources in the specification. 
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firm and calendar quarter levels (this applies to all the remaining analyses).15 
We present our findings Table 3. Consistent with the theory of Rajan (1992), we find that the 
coefficient on Media Sentiment is positive and significant, suggesting that the probability of a non-
relationship lead arranger syndicating the loan is increasing in media sentiment. A one standard 
deviation increase in media sentiment increases the probability that a loan is syndicated by a non-
relationship lead arranger by 6.2%.  
With respect to control variables, similar to Gopalan et al. (2011), we find that the probability 
of a non-relationship lender syndicating the loan decreases when the borrower’s previous loan is still 
outstanding when the current loan is issued (Outstanding), but increases as the time span between 
the current and the previous loan increases (Time-Between). We do not find that the tightness of the 
credit supply significantly affects the probability of a non-relationship lead arranger originating the 
loan. The probability of a non-relationship lender syndicating the loan is also affected by a 
borrower’s interest coverage, size, Z-score, and market-to-book ratio. When borrowers issue larger 
loans or loans with a longer maturity, we find that it is less likely for these loans to be arranged by 
non-relationship lenders. These results suggest that because non-relationship lenders have inferior 
access to a borrower’s private information relative to relationship lenders, they are less willing to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
14 Consider a simple example. Assume that equity investors’ information set consists of two signals, X1 (e.g., 
media sentiment) and X2 (another signal). This information is impounded into equilibrium price.  Assume the 
equilibrium price applies equal weights to the signals giving: Price = X1+X2. Assume that for credit purposes, a 
lender would optimally weight the signals as: Credit quality = 1X1 + 2X2. The lender cannot observe X1 and X2 
separately, but instead observes X1 and the stock price. How would lenders use these signals? Given that they 
want to optimally weight the signals for credit purposes, they would construct the following estimate of credit 
quality: Credit Quality = 1X1 + 2*(Price – X1) = 1X1 + 2X2. That is, even though the price fully impounds X1 
(e.g., media sentiment), lenders find it optimal to use X1 in addition to price in order to achieve the desired 
weights on X1 and X2. 
15
 Given Greene’s (2004) criticism of the inclusion of fixed effects in non-linear models, we do not include year, 
industry and loan purpose fixed effects. The same applies to the probability of a non-relationship lender 
syndicate participation model.  
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syndicate larger and longer term credit. 
We find a negative coefficient on Press Release Sentiment. It is important to note here that 
press releases are an aspect of a firm’s strategic disclosure decisions. For example, firms may issue 
positive press releases when they are trying to counter negative events or to run up stock prices 
around mergers (e.g., Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012, and Ahern and Sosyura, 2014). Most important 
for our purposes is that our Media Sentiment result is robust to including press release sentiment, 
which rules out the possibility that media simply echoes firm press releases. We also find a negative 
coefficient on Analyst Coverage; this result is in line with Gopalan et al. (2011).  
4.2. The effect of media sentiment on syndicate participation and lead arranger share 
We next investigate the relation between media sentiment and syndicate participation. We 
predict that the likelihood of less informed lenders with no previous relationship with the borrower 
or the lead arranger participating in a syndicate is increasing in media sentiment. We follow Sufi 
(2007) and estimate the following logit model at the syndicate participant level: 
 0 1 2 3 ,Participation Media Sentiment Controls Alternative InfoSources             (2) 
where Participation is one of two participant relationship variables. Part-Borr No-Relationship is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if the participant has not participated in a borrower’s loans in 
the five years prior to a loan’s issuance date, and zero otherwise. Part-Lead No Relationship is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if the participant has not participated in a syndicate arranged 
by the loan’s lead arranger in the five years preceding the loan’s issuance, and zero otherwise. 
Media Sentiment is our main variable of interest, for which we predict 1 > 0. 
As in model (1), we control for borrower characteristics reflecting its creditworthiness. We also 
extend the set of loan-specific controls. We add controls for a borrower’s previous relationship with 
the lead arranger (Borr-Lead No-Relationship) and for whether this is the first deal syndicated by the 
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lead arranger (First Time Lead), as both can affect the attractiveness of the loan deal to participants. 
We also control for whether the loan is secured (Collateral), the existence of performance pricing 
provisions (PP) and the number of covenants (#Covenants).16 Similar to model 1, we control for 
alternative information sources about the borrower and its stock returns. 
We present our findings in Table 4. In column 1, we report the estimation of model (1) with 
Part-Borr No-Relationship as the dependent variable. Consistent with our predictions, the coefficient 
on Media Sentiment is positive and significant, indicating that the probability of a participant with no 
relationship with the borrower joining the syndicate increases with media sentiment. This result is 
also economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment increases this 
probability by 7.1%.  
With respect to controls, in line with lower information asymmetry between the lead arranger 
and participants when a borrower is more creditworthy, we find positive coefficients on ROA, 
Interest Coverage, and Z-Score and a negative coefficient on Leverage. We also find a positive 
coefficient on Borr-Lead No-Relationship, which suggests that the probability of non-relationship 
participants joining the syndicate increases when a new lead arranger with no previous relationship 
with the borrower arranges the loan. The coefficient on Press Release Sentiment is insignificant, 
suggesting that while media sentiment influences less informed participants, the content of firm-
initiated press releases does not incrementally affect their participation likelihood. When a firm is 
rated, the probability of a non-relationship participant joining the syndicate is significantly higher, 
consistent with their higher confidence in a loan’s quality when creditworthiness is assessed by an 
independent third party (e.g., Sufi, 2007). Note that the coefficients on Return and Negative Return 
                                                          
16
 We do not control for these three additional loan characteristics in model 1, because they are typically 
determined during the negotiation process between a lead arranger and the borrower and therefore cannot 
affect the choice of the lead lender. In any case, in untabulated analyses, we find that our results are robust to 
the inclusion of these variables.  
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are difficult to interpret. Stock returns consist of two components: changes in cash flow news and 
changes in discount rates (e.g., Vuolteenaho, 2002). Stock return controls therefore reflect both 
news about the firms’s performance and the discount rate news associated with a firm’s riskiness 
(our findings do not change when we control for return volatility).  
In column 2, we report the results from the estimation of model (1) with Part-Lead No- 
Relationship as the dependent variable and find similar results. The coefficient on Media Sentiment 
is positive and significant, suggesting that the probability of a participant without a previous 
relationship with the lead arranger joining the syndicate increases with media sentiment. A one 
standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment increases this probability by 9.3%. The coefficients 
on the control variables are generally consistent with those in column 1.  
Our results so far indicate that more positive media sentiment extends the range of 
participants willing to join the syndicate to those without a relationship with the borrower or the 
lead arranger. Column 3 focuses on the loan share retained by the lead arranger (Lead Share). We 
predict that the share of a loan retained by the lead arranger is decreasing in media sentiment as 
participants require the lead to have less skin in the game.  
We estimate model (2) as an OLS specification with Lead Share as the dependent variable. This 
specification also includes loan purpose17, industry and year fixed effects. In line with our 
expectations, we find a negative and significant coefficient on Media Sentiment. A one standard 
deviation increase in media sentiment decreases the loan proportion held by the lead arranger by 
5.3%. This evidence further supports a significant effect of media sentiment on syndicate structure 
and suggests that it operates via both channels – syndicate participants’ willingness to join the 
                                                          
17
 It is common in the literature to control for differences in the purpose of the loan (i.e., LBO, M&A, 
restructuring, refinancing, general corporate purposes, etc.), as the riskiness of a loan and the level of 
information asymmetry across lenders can vary substantially by loan type. 
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syndicate and the loan share the lead arranger is required to retain.  
With respect to control variables, a lead arranger retains a smaller proportion of the loan 
when the borrower is larger and more profitable. Consistent with lower agency problems within the 
syndicate when a borrower is more transparent (e.g., Sufi, 2007), the lead arranger retains a smaller 
proportion of the loan when a borrower is rated and has analyst coverage. We also find that a non-
relationship lead arranger and a first time lead arranger hold a higher loan share, suggesting that 
participants require a lead arranger to have higher skin in the game in these cases.  
 
4.3. The effect of media sentiment on loan pricing  
Our analyses show that the decisions of less informed lenders to arrange and 
participate in syndicated loans are sensitive to media sentiment, where loan attractiveness 
is increasing in media sentiment. While it is important to show connections between media 
sentiment and lenders’ decisions, our results thus far do not quantify the implications of 
media sentiment from the perspective of a borrower seeking financing. We examine this 
issue in this section.  
As we show in our previous analyses, higher media sentiment not only increases a 
non-relationship lead arranger’s aggressiveness in bidding for a loan, but also attracts less 
informed syndicate participants to join the syndicate. This expanded set of outside lenders is 
likely to increase the supply of financing available to fund the borrower’s loan, exerting 
significant downward pressure on the interest rate spread.  
To examine this hypothesis, we estimate the following OLS model:  
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  0 1 2 3 ,Interest Spread= Media Sentiment Controls Alternative Info Sources             (3) 
where Spread is the logarithm of the interest rate spread in basis points above LIBOR. We predict a 
negative coefficient on our main variable of interest – Media Sentiment. Variables reflecting controls 
and other information sources about the borrower are defined as previously. Further, the model 
includes loan purpose, industry and year fixed effects.   
We present our findings in Table 5. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the interest 
spread is inversely associated with media sentiment, with more positive sentiment reducing the 
interest spread. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in Media 
Sentiment translates into a 6.9 basis point decrease in spread. While this effect seems relatively 
modest, it is similar to the effect of a one standard deviation change in key credit risk measures, 
such as ROA (5.5 basis points) and Leverage (12.7 basis points).  
With respect to controls, as expected, we report a negative relation between the spread and a 
borrower’s profitability, size, Z-Score, and market-to-book ratio and a positive relation between the 
spread and leverage and an indicator variable reflecting losses. The coefficients on the loan-level 
controls are generally consistent with prior research. Larger loans and loans with pricing provisions 
are associated with lower spreads (Booth, 1992, and Asquith et al., 2005). Due to the endogenous 
determination of contractual terms, we observe a positive relation between the interest spread and 
both Collateral and #Covenants (Berger and Udell, 1990, Bradley and Roberts, 2004, and Costello 
and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011).18 While concurrently endogenizing all loan terms is beyond the 
scope of our paper, in untabulated analyses we estimate the interest rate model excluding loan 
                                                          
18
 Agency theory suggests that there is a trade-off between the restrictions imposed by the loan contract and 
the interest spread (Jensen and Meckling, 1979, Myers, 1977, and Smith and Warner, 1979). However, because 
more risky borrowers are likely to have higher spreads and lenders can simultaneously impose a higher 
number of covenants and/or require them to provide collateral, empirical tests typically reveal a positive 
relation between these variables.  
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controls; our findings are unchanged. We find that revolvers (Term Loans B and below) are priced at 
lower (higher) rates, consistent with prior research (Harjoto et al., 2004, Zhang, 2008, Nandy and 
Shao, 2010, and Lim et al., 2014). We also show that more positive press release sentiment and 
analyst coverage are negatively associated with the spread.   
The results presented in Tables 3-5 are consistent with the media providing incremental 
information to less informed, non-relationship lenders. To further support our claim that these 
lenders learn directly from the media, in an Online Appendix we provide additional analyses that 
address alternative information sources available for lenders in more detail. In particular, with 
respect to information provided by rating agencies, we account for the level of a borrower’s credit 
rating, whether it is on a credit watchlist and its long-term credit outlook at a loan’s issuance date as 
well as over the 180 days period prior to the issuance.  We also account for equity analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and recommendations at the time of a loan’s issuance and the forecast and 
recommendation revisions over the 180 days prior to the issuance. We find that our main findings 
and inferences are robust to controlling for these additional information variables.  
4.4 Is the media a direct source of information to less informed, outside lenders? 
To provide further evidence that the media is a direct source of information to lenders, we 
conduct analyses conditional on the intensity of a borrower’s analysts’ coverage. We conjecture that 
if media sentiment is informative to less informed lenders, its effect on syndicate structure will be 
stronger when a borrower’s coverage by other information intermediaries is less intensive. This 
prediction is motivated by prior evidence that analysts are an important information source to 
lenders (e.g., Guntay and Hackbarth, 2010, and Mansi et al., 2010). Therefore, outside lenders will 
rely more on alternative information sources, such as the media, when analyst following is relatively 
low. The idea is that investors’ posterior expectations will respond more intensively to an 
information signal of a given precision, as prior uncertainty about a firm’s prospects increases (e.g., 
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Verrecchia, 2001). We classify borrowers as having highly intensive analyst coverage if the number 
of analysts covering the firm falls into the top quintile of the sample distribution, and as less 
intensive otherwise. We then estimate models (1), (2), and (3) for the two subsamples – borrowers 
with highly intensive and less intensive coverage.19 We report these tests in Table 6.  
As evidenced from Panel A, for the lead arranger analyses, the coefficient on Media Sentiment 
is positive and significant for the less intensive analyst coverage partition, but it is not significant for 
the highly intensive coverage partition, although the difference in the coefficients between the two 
partitions is not significant. Economically, for the less intensive analyst coverage partition, a one 
standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment increases the probability that a lender without a 
prior relationship with the borrower arranges the loan by 7.6%. 
We find that for both the Part-Borr No-Relationship and Part-Lead No-Relationship 
specifications, the coefficient on Media Sentiment is negative and significant for the less intensive 
analyst coverage partition, but it is not significant for the highly intensive coverage partition (Table 6, 
Panels B and C). The difference in coefficients on Media Sentiment between these partitions is also 
statistically significant. For the less intensive analyst coverage subsample, a one standard deviation 
increase in Media Sentiment increases the probability that a syndicate participant without a prior 
relationship with the borrower (lead arranger) joins the syndicate by 12.1% (12.1%). The results are 
similar when we examine the lead bank’s loan share aspect of the syndicate structure (Table 6, Panel 
D). The effect of media sentiment is significant for borrowers with less intensive analyst coverage, 
but not for those with highly intensive coverage. The difference in coefficients on Media Sentiment 
between the two partitions is significant at the 10% level. For borrowers with less intensive analyst 
coverage, a one standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment decreases the proportion held by 
                                                          
19 For all analyses, our results are robust when we define borrowers as having highly intensive analyst 
coverage if the number of analysts covering the firm falls into the top quartile of the sample distribution.  
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the lead arranger by 4.6%.  
We also predict that the effect of media sentiment on the interest spread will be stronger for 
the less intensive analyst coverage partition. In Table 6, Panel E, we report that the coefficient on 
Media Sentiment is negative and significant for the less intensive coverage partition, but not 
significant for the highly intensive partition. The difference in coefficients on Media Sentiment 
between these partitions is statistically significant. For the less intensive analyst coverage 
subsample, a one standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment translates into a 7.3 basis points 
decrease in the interest spread. 
The results presented in Table 6, Panels A-E are in line with the media providing more 
informative public signals to syndicate participants when information production by other 
information intermediaries is less intensive. However, firms with intensive analyst coverage can 
potentially differ from firms with less intensive coverage across a number of dimensions. We 
therefore examine how the effect of media sentiment differs across borrowers that have 
experienced a reduction in analysts’ coverage prior to loan initiation and those that have not. A 
reduction in analyst coverage has been shown to be associated with an exogenous (unrelated to 
changes in firm fundamentals) decrease in public information production about the firm (e.g., Kelly 
and Ljungqvist, 2012, and Balakrishnan et al., 2013). We hypothesize that media signals will be more 
informative to non-relationship lead arrangers and syndicate participants following coverage 
reductions. We report these analyses in Table 7.  
We identify that 4.3% of observations in the lead arranger analyses, 6.3% in the syndicate 
participant analyses, 4.2% in the lender share analyses, and 4.5% in the loan spread analysis relate to 
borrowers that have experienced a reduction in analyst coverage over the year preceding loan 
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issuance.20 Despite the small size of the coverage reduction partition, we find a significantly higher 
coefficient on Media Sentiment for this partition in Borr-Lead No-Relationship, Part-Borr No-
Relationship and Spread analyses (Panels A, B and E). For the Lead Share analyses (Panel D), the 
coefficient on Media Sentiment for the analyst coverage reduction partition is higher than the 
respective coefficient for the no coverage reduction partition, but the difference is not statistically 
significant, likely due to the extremely small sample size of the coverage reduction partition. 21  
Overall, the stronger effects of media sentiment on the likelihood of a non-
relationship lead arranger, syndicate structure, and loan pricing for the less intensive analyst 
coverage and reduction in analyst coverage partitions reinforce our inference that the 
media serves as a direct source of information to less informed, outside lenders.  
4.5 The sensitivity of interest spreads to media sentiment for consumer-product firms 
The results in Tables 3-7 suggest that the media influences loan pricing by providing 
incremental information to outside lenders, which increases the supply of credit by 
attracting non-relationship lead arrangers and syndicate participants. In this section, we 
explore an additional channel through which the media can affect interest spreads by 
examining the possibility that the media influences consumers’ perceptions of a borrower, 
changing their future purchasing decisions and consequently a borrower’s future cash flows. 
                                                          
20 When we measure analyst coverage reduction over the 180 day period prior to loan issuance, the 
proportion of borrowers that have experienced a reduction in analyst coverage becomes even smaller, 
preventing us from conducting empirical analyses.   
21 For Part-Lead No-Relationship analysis (Panel C), we do not find that the coefficient on Media Sentiment is 
significantly higher for the analyst reduction partition. This could be due to a lack of power in this small sample 
setting, as prior research has shown that a previous relationship between a participant and lead arranger is 
relatively less important than a previous relationship between a participant and the borrower (Sufi, 2007). 
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Specifically, we examine whether spreads are more sensitive to media sentiment for 
consumer-product-oriented firms. Consumers’ decisions to purchase a firm’s products are 
potentially influenced by positive or negative news about the firm, affecting its future sales 
and cash flows. Because lenders are likely to incorporate the behavior of a borrower’s 
consumers into loan pricing, we predict that the effect of media sentiment on loan pricing is 
likely to be more pronounced for more consumer-product oriented firms.  
Following Fisman et al. (2006), we identify whether a borrower is consumer product oriented 
by the relative importance of its advertising expenses. We classify borrowers as having high 
consumer-product intensity if the ratio of advertising expenses to sales revenue is above the sample 
median. We estimate the interest rate model for the consumer-product intensity partitions and 
report our findings in Table 8. Consistent with our predictions, we find that although the coefficient 
on Media Sentiment is negative and significant for both partitions, it is significantly larger for the 
high consumer-product intensity partition relative to the low intensity partition.  
Overall, our interest spread analyses suggests that media sentiment affects loan pricing both 
by informing less informed outside lenders and by changing consumers’ perception of a borrower, 
the implications of which are priced by lenders.  
5. Summary 
This paper examines whether media coverage influences the syndicated loan origination and 
participation decisions of informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures and 
interest spreads. We first investigate if the media influences competition between inside and outside 
lenders to serve as lead arranger on a borrower’s loan. This analysis builds on Rajan (1992) who 
shows that the aggressiveness with which less informed lenders compete for a loan deal increases in 
the sentiment of public information signals about a borrower. We find that the probability of a non-
  
 
 
34 
relationship lender serving as a lead arranger is higher when media sentiment is more positive. 
We also consider whether media sentiment influences the willingness of lenders to participate 
as members in a loan syndicate.  Syndicate participants face both adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems (e.g., Sufi, 2007, Ivashina, 2009) and the media can influence lenders’ participation 
through either channel. We find that the probability of non-relationship participants joining the 
syndicate increases in media sentiment. Consistent with more positive media sentiment reducing 
the agency problems faced by less informed participants, we also show that the loan share retained 
by the lead arranger (i.e., the lead’s skin in the game) is decreasing in media sentiment. We finally 
show that more positive media sentiment is associated with a lower interest rate spread. We 
attribute this finding to the increased supply of credit available to the borrower due to more positive 
media sentiment attracting non-relationship lead arrangers and syndicate participants.  
Further, we provide evidence consistent with the media being a direct source of information 
to lenders. First, we show that our results hold after controlling extensively for alternative public 
information sources, including analysts, rating agencies, and firm-initiated press releases. Second, 
we show that loan origination and participation decisions, as well as the loan share retained by the 
lead arranger and loan pricing, are more sensitive to media sentiment when a borrower’s analyst 
coverage is lower and for borrowers that have experienced an exogenous reduction in analyst 
coverage preceding loan issuance. Finally, we provide evidence that loan spreads are more sensitive 
to media sentiment for consumer-product-oriented borrowers, consistent with lenders accounting 
for the implications of the news for consumers’ perception of a borrower and the resultant impact 
on the borrower’s future sales and cash flows.  
By providing evidence that the media serves as an important information intermediary in the 
private debt market, we extend the growing body of research on the role played by the media in 
capital markets. Our findings also add to the extensive literature on syndicated lending, as we 
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demonstrate that the media fundamentally alters the information structure and the nature of 
competition in the loan market. In particular, an important insight gleaned from our work is that not 
only the availability of public information about a borrower, but also its sentiment significantly 
influences the central characteristics of syndicated lending. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Amount The natural logarithm of the loan amount in US dollars. (DealScan). 
 
Analyst Coverage  An indicator variable equal to 1 if there are any analysts following 
the firm in the month prior to the loan issuance date, 0 otherwise 
(I/B/E/S). 
 
  
  
Collateral An indicator equal to 1 if the loan is secured, 0 otherwise. (DealScan). 
 
  
First Time Lead An indicator variable equal to 1 if the lender serves as the lead 
arranger for the first time, 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
  
Interest Coverage Earnings before interest and tax divided by the interest expense, 
estimated in the quarter preceding a loan’s issuance (Compustat). 
 
Lead Share The share of the loan held by the lead arranger, expressed in 
percentages (DealScan). 
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Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets, estimated in the quarter 
preceding a loan’s issuance (Compustat). 
 
Loss An indicator variable equal to 1 if ROA is less than zero, 0 otherwise 
(Compustat). 
 
Maturity The number of months to maturity (DealScan). 
 
Media  Sentiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The average Composite Sentiment Score (CSS) over the 180 day 
period prior to a loan’s issuance date for full-size articles, conditional 
on the article’s relevance score above 75. Firm-initiated press 
releases are excluded from this estimation. CSS combines 5 
sentiment scores (PEQ, BEE, BMQ, BCA, and BAM), while insuring 
that there is no sentiment disagreement amongst these scores. The 
PEQ score represents the news sentiment of the given news item 
according to the PEQ classifier, which specializes in identifying 
positive and negative words and phrases in articles about global 
equities. The BEE score represents the news sentiment of a given 
story according to the BEE classifier, which specializes in news stories 
about earnings evaluations. The BMQ score represents the news 
sentiment of a given story according to the BMQ classifier, which 
specializes in short commentary and editorials on global equity 
markets. The BCA score represents the news sentiment of a given 
news story according to the BCA classifier, which specializes in 
reports on corporate action announcements. The BAM score 
represents the news sentiment of a given story according to the BAM 
classifier, which specializes in news stories about mergers, 
acquisitions and takeovers. 
 
CSS scores range from 0 to 100, with a score above 50 indicating 
positive news sentiment; equal to 50, neutral news sentiment; and 
below 50, negative news sentiment. We apply a linear transformation 
to the CSS score and define Media Content = (CSS-50)/50, so that the 
Media Content ranges from -1 to 1, with zero being equivalent to 
neutral sentiment (RavenPack). 
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MTB The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity, 
estimated in the quarter preceding a loan’s issuance   (Compustat). 
 
Negative Return An indicator variable equal to 1 if Return is less than zero, 0 
otherwise (CRSP). 
 
Borr-Lead No-Relationship 
  
An indicator variable equal to 1 if a loan’s lead arranger has 
syndicated less than 50 percent of a borrower’s prior loan deals by 
volume over the five year period preceding the loan issuance date, 0 
otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Outstanding An indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower’s previous deals are 
still outstanding at the current loan’s issuance date, 0 otherwise 
(DealScan). 
 
Part-Borr No-Relationship 
  
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has not been 
involved in a deal with the borrower over the five year period 
preceding the loan issuance date, 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Part-Lead No-Relationship 
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has not been 
involved in a deal with the lead arranger over the five year period 
preceding the loan issuance date, 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
 The average of the Current Outlook variable over the 180 day period 
prior to a loan’s issuance data. Current Outlook is equal to -1 (1) if a 
borrower is on a negative or developing (positive) credit outlook at a 
loan’s issuance date. The variable is equal to 0 if a borrower does not 
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have either a positive or negative outlook at a loan’s issuance date 
(S&P historical database). 
 
  
Press Release Sentiment The average CSS for firm-initiated press releases with a relevance 
score greater than 90, estimated over the 180 day period prior to a 
loan’s issuance date (RavenPack). 
 
PP An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan has a performance pricing 
provision, 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Rated An indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower has a senior debt 
rating from S&P, Moody’s or Fitch, zero otherwise (DealScan and S&P 
historical database).     
 
  
Revolver An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is a revolving line of credit, 
0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Return The firm’s market-adjusted (value-weighted) cumulative return over 
the 180 day period prior to a loan’s issuance date. 
 
ROA Return on assets, defined as earnings before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets and estimated in the quarter preceding a 
loan’s issuance (Compustat). 
 
Spread The natural logarithm of the loan spread over LIBOR (DealScan). 
 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets, estimated in the quarter 
preceding a loan’s issuance (Compustat). 
 
Term Loan B An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan type is Term loan B or 
below (C, D, E and F), 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
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Tight Credit Supply An indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in bank lending 
standards for mid-sized and large commercial loans, as reported in 
the Federal Reserve Board’s quarterly Senior Loan Officer Opinion 
Survey on Bank Lending Practices, in the quarter of a loan’s 
origination is in the top quartile of the sample’s distribution, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Time-Between The number of days between the loan’s issuance date and the 
previous deal (DealScan). 
 
Z-Score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Altman’s (1968) bankruptcy measure, estimated by the following 
model: 
 
Z= 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.999X5, 
 
where X1 is defined as working capital (total current asset minus total 
current liabilities) divided by total assets. X2 is defined as retained 
earnings divided by total assets. X3 is defined as earnings before 
interest and taxes divided by total assets. X4 is the market value of 
equity divided by total liabilities. X5 is total sales divided by total 
assets. All measures are estimated in the quarter preceding a loan’s 
issuance (Compustat). 
 
  
  
#Covenants The number of financial covenants (DealScan). 
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Table 1 – Sample Selection 
 
This table presents the sample selection process.  
 
  
Number of facilities Filters  
   
Syndicated loans to public U.S. borrowers, in U.S. dollars, issued over the period 
2000-2012 
31,974 
   
After elimination of the facilities of firms not covered by RavenPack  24,308 
   
After elimination of the facilities with missing loan data 12,397 
   
After elimination of the facilities with insufficient firm and media data 7,244 
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics (see Table 1 for the sample selection procedure). Variables are defined 
in Appendix A.  
 
Variable N Mean Median StdDev 
Media      
   Media Sentiment 6,964 -0.0046 0.0000 0.0386 
     
Primary Loan Characteristics    
   Borr-Lead No-Relationship  7,255 0.6379 1.0000 0.4806 
   Part-Borr No-Relationship  60,082 0.5675 0.0000 0.4954 
   Part-Lead No-Relationship  60,082 0.1525 1.0000 0.3595 
   Lead Share (%) 4,613 21.0525 13.3750 20.4714 
   Spread 6,964 5.0720 5.1648 0.7221 
Firm Characteristics     
   ROA 6,964 0.0085 0.0102 0.0253 
   Interest Coverage 6,964 10.5052 2.1228 40.9157 
   Leverage 6,964 0.2520 0.2373 0.1789 
   Size 6,964 7.2521 7.2688 1.6609 
   Z-Score 6,964 2.2403 1.6907 2.2198 
   MTB 6,964 3.0102 2.0201 3.7461 
   Loss 6,964 0.1476 0.0000 0.3547 
Additional Loan Characteristics    
   Amount 6,964 18.9334 19.1138 1.4854 
   Maturity 6,964 47.9482 57.0000 21.4141 
   PP 6,964 0.7143 1.0000 0.4519 
   Collateral 6,964 0.6392 1.0000 0.4802 
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   #Covenants 6,964 2.3109 2.0000 1.0131 
   Revolver 6,964 0.6229 1.0000 0.4846 
   Term Loan B 6,964 0.1002 0.0000 0.3006 
Additional Information sources    
    Press Release Sentiment 6,964 0.0243 0.0264 0.0287 
    Rated 6,964 0.5595 1.0000 0.4964 
    Analyst Coverage 6,964 0.8751 1.0000 0.3307 
Returns     
   Return 6,964 0.0558 0.0216 0.3121 
   Negative Return 6,964 0.4275 0.0000 0.4947 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Media Sentiment and the Probability of a Non-Relationship Lead Arranger  
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This table presents the analysis of the effect of media sentiment on the probability of a non-relationship lender 
serving as a loan’s lead arranger. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Variables   Dependent Variable: Borr-Lead No-Relationship 
Media Sentiment  1.5474** 
  (0.6393) 
Outstanding  -0.2217*** 
  (0.0808) 
Time-Between  0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) 
Tight Credit Supply  0.0280 
  (0.0656) 
ROA  0.1141 
  (0.8343) 
Interest Coverage  0.0017** 
  (0.0007) 
Leverage  -0.1801 
  (0.1812) 
Size  -0.0767** 
  (0.0305) 
Z-score  -0.0177* 
  (0.0092) 
MTB  0.0097*** 
  (0.0032) 
Loss  0.3560*** 
  (0.0811) 
Amount  -0.1487*** 
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  (0.0323) 
Maturity  -0.0068*** 
  (0.0014) 
Revolver  0.1259* 
  (0.0664) 
Term Loan B  0.0462 
  (0.1045) 
Press Release Sentiment -3.1423** 
  (1.3519) 
Rated  0.0743 
  (0.0657) 
Analyst Coverage  -0.2312*** 
  (0.0872) 
Return  0.2028* 
  (0.1194) 
Negative Return  0.0244 
  (0.0707) 
     
N  7,255 
R
2
   0.0247 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Media Sentiment and Syndicate Structure 
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The table presents the analyses of the effects of media sentiment on the characteristics of the syndicate’s 
structure. Column 1 (2) presents the analysis of the variable reflecting a participant’s prior relationship with 
the borrower (the lead arranger), while column 3 presents the analysis of the loan share retained by the lead 
arranger. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable 
 
Part-Borr 
No-Relationship 
Part-Lead 
No-Relationship 
Lead Share 
 
Media  Sentiment 1.7654** 2.3114** -28.7105*** 
 (0.7714) (1.1204) (6.8194) 
ROA 3.2091* -0.9517 -101.6974*** 
 (1.6573) (2.3441) (24.5548) 
Interest Coverage 0.0026** 0.0017 0.0013 
 (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0158) 
Leverage -0.4195** 0.4476 -6.2121* 
 (0.1925) (0.3423) (3.5286) 
Size -0.1409*** -0.0646 -2.2487*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0490) (0.6833) 
Z-score 0.0641*** -0.0190 0.1689 
 (0.0192) (0.0301) (0.3279) 
MTB -0.0001 -0.0155* -0.0041 
 (0.0061) (0.0092) (0.1061) 
Loss 0.1358 0.1263 0.5926 
 (0.0833) (0.1217) (1.3263) 
Amount 0.0196 -0.0358 -5.9624*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0419) (0.6365) 
Maturity 0.0050*** -0.0041** -0.1084*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0329) 
Spread 0.3591*** 0.2945*** 0.1706 
 (0.0343) (0.0696) (1.0446) 
Collateral 0.1044* 0.0119 -0.2789 
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 (0.0603) (0.0896) (1.1808) 
PP 0.2208*** -0.0365 -7.8570*** 
 (0.0543) (0.0896) (1.7009) 
#Covenants 0.0377 0.1479*** -0.9175* 
 (0.0287) (0.0424) (0.5226) 
Revolver -0.2142*** -0.1186** 1.0176 
 (0.0362) (0.0605) (0.9951) 
Term Loan B 0.2446*** 0.5395*** 15.4806*** 
 (0.0832) (0.1224) (2.2275) 
Borr-Lead No-Relationship 0.4786*** 0.5447*** 2.2707*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0750) (0.4899) 
First Time Lead 0.1061 1.7979*** 4.8580* 
 (0.1577) (0.3378) (2.7667) 
Press Release  Sentiment 0.0181 -0.6315 13.6202 
 (0.7750) (1.2702) (16.4236) 
Rated 0.1824*** 0.1268 -2.0909* 
 (0.0662) (0.0986) (1.1038) 
Analyst Coverage 0.0117 -0.1215 -5.0446** 
 (0.0910) (0.1569) (2.1421) 
Return 0.3726*** 0.3464** -2.7937* 
 (0.1203) (0.1755) (1.4571) 
Negative Return 0.2131*** 0.1245 0.4680 
  (0.0616) (0.0994) (0.7463) 
    
Model Logit  Logit OLS 
Fixed Effects None None Year/Industry/ 
Purpose 
N 60,082 60,082 4,613 
R2 0.0561 0.0620 0.4900 
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Table 5 – Media Sentiment and Interest Rate Spread  
 
This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the interest spread. ***, **, * indicates 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Variable   Dependent Variable: Spread 
Media Sentiment   -1.0930*** 
  (0.2479) 
ROA  -1.3283*** 
  (0.3475) 
Interest Coverage  0.0000 
  (0.0000) 
Leverage  0.4288*** 
  (0.0581) 
Size  -0.0396*** 
  (0.0106) 
Z-score  -0.0078** 
  (0.0035) 
MTB  -0.0076** 
  (0.0030) 
Loss  0.1287*** 
  (0.0236) 
Amount  -0.0676*** 
  (0.0078) 
Maturity  -0.0004 
  (0.0004) 
Collateral  0.5123*** 
  (0.0252) 
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PP  -0.1143*** 
  (0.0192) 
#Covenants  0.0939*** 
  (0.0085) 
Revolver  -0.0733*** 
  (0.0157) 
Term Loan B  0.1725*** 
  (0.0258) 
Press Release Sentiment  -0.9077*** 
  (0.2519) 
Rated  -0.0021 
  (0.0235) 
Analyst Coverage  -0.0607*** 
  (0.0218) 
Return  0.0800*** 
  (0.0294) 
Negative Return   0.0314** 
  (0.0155) 
   
Fixed Effects  Year/Industry/Purpose 
N  6,964 
R
2
  0.6697 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 – The Effect of Media Sentiment Conditional on Intensity of Analysts’ Coverage  
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This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the probability of a non-relationship 
lender serving as a loan’s lead arranger (Borr-Lead No-Relationship), the probability of a participant’s prior 
relationship with the borrower (Part-Borr No-Relationship), the probability of a participant’s prior relationship 
with the lead arranger (Part-Lead No-Relationship), the loan share retained by the lead arranger (Lead Share) 
and the interest spread (Spread), conditional on equity analysts’ coverage intensity. ***, **, * indicates 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively. ###, ##, # indicates that the difference across analyst 
coverage partitions is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: The probability of a non-relationship lead arranger, conditional on analyst coverage intensity 
 
 Dependent Variable: Borr-Lead No-Relationship 
Variable Less Intensive Coverage Highly Intensive Coverage 
Media Sentiment 1.8891** 0.5731 
 (1.081)
 
(1.951) 
   
Model Logit Logit 
Controls Included Included 
N 5,268 1,987 
R
2 
 0.0402 0.0848 
   
 
Panel B: The syndicate participation of lenders without a prior relationship with the borrower, 
conditional on analyst coverage intensity 
 Dependent Variable: Part-Borr No-Relationship 
Variable Less Intensive Coverage Highly Intensive Coverage 
Media Sentiment 2.956*** -1.3446 
 (0.908)##
 
(1.693) 
   
Model Logit Logit 
Controls Included Included 
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Observations 41,760 18,322 
Pseudo R
2 
0.0552 0.0577 
   
 
Panel C: The syndicate participation of lenders without a prior relationship with the lead arranger, 
conditional on analyst coverage intensity 
 Dependent Variable: Part-Lead No-Relationship 
Variable Less Intensive Coverage Highly Intensive Coverage 
Media Sentiment 2.9520** 0.6063 
 (1.259)## (1.764) 
   
Model Logit Logit 
Controls Included Included 
Observations 41,760 18,322 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0674 0.0529 
Panel D: The loan share retained by the lead arranger, conditional on analyst coverage intensity 
 
 Dependent Variable: Lead Share 
Variable Less Intensive Coverage Highly Intensive Coverage 
Media Sentiment -25.175*** -10.1900 
 (8.131)#
 
(20.378) 
   
Model OLS OLS 
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Year/Industry/Purpose Year/Industry/Purpose 
Observations 3,108 1,505 
R
2 
0.4646 0.6451 
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Panel E: Loan pricing, conditional on analyst coverage intensity 
  
 Dependent Variable: Spread 
Variable Less Intensive Coverage Highly Intensive Coverage 
Media Sentiment -1.1654*** -0.6627 
 (0.209)### (0.449) 
   
Model OLS OLS 
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Y/I/P Y/I/P 
Observations 5,073 1,891 
R
2 
0.6492 0.7580 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 – The Effect of Media Sentiment Conditional on Analyst Coverage Reduction 
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This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the probability of a non-relationship 
lender serving as a loan’s lead arranger (Borr-Lead No-Relationship), the probability of a participant’s prior 
relationship with the borrower (Part-Borr No-Relationship), the probability of a participant’s prior relationship 
with the lead arranger (Part-Lead No-Relationship), the loan share retained by the lead arranger (Lead Share) 
and the interest spread (Spread), conditional on equity analysts’ coverage reduction. ***, **, * indicates 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively. ###, ##, # indicates that the difference across analyst 
coverage partitions is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: The probability of a non-relationship lead arranger, conditional on analyst coverage reduction 
 
 Dependent Variable: Borr-Lead No-Relationship 
Variable No Coverage Reduction Coverage Reduction 
Media Sentiment 1.3533* 7.9796* 
 (0.957) (5.079) # 
   
Model Logit Logit 
Controls Included Included 
Observations 6,941 314 
Pseudo R
2 
 0.0502 0.0731 
   
 
Panel B: The syndicate participation of lenders without a prior relationship with the borrower, conditional 
on analyst coverage reduction 
 Dependent Variable: Part-Borr No-Relationship 
Variable No Coverage Reduction Coverage Reduction 
Media Sentiment 1.6771** 4.1932* 
 (0.796)
 
(2.640)# 
   
Model Logit Logit 
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Controls Included Included 
Observations 56,274 3,807 
Pseudo R
2 
0.0571 0.0835 
   
 
Panel C: The syndicate participation of lenders without a prior relationship with the lead arranger, 
conditional on analyst coverage reduction 
 Dependent Variable: Part-Lead No-Relationship 
Variable No Coverage Reduction Coverage Reduction 
Media Sentiment 2.4008** 0.6238 
 (1.155) (3.920) 
   
Model Logit Logit 
Controls Included Included 
Observations 56,274 3,807 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0613 0.0873 
Panel D: The loan share retained by the lead arranger, conditional on analyst coverage reduction 
 
 Dependent Variable: Lead Share 
Variable No Coverage Reduction Coverage Reduction 
Media Sentiment -25.7339*** -35.0953 
 (7.144)
 
(52.041) 
   
Model OLS OLS 
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Year/Industry/Purpose Year/Industry/Purpose 
Observations 4,417 196 
R
2 
0.4890 0.7396 
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Panel E: Loan pricing, conditional on analyst coverage reduction 
  
 Dependent Variable: Spread 
Variable No Coverage Reduction Coverage Reduction 
Media Sentiment -1.1771*** -3.2312** 
 (0.206) (1.396)## 
   
Model OLS OLS 
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Year/Industry/Purpose Year/Industry/Purpose 
Observations 6,654 310 
R
2 
 0.6619 0.8496 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 – The Effect of Media Content on Loan Pricing, Conditional on a Borrower’s Consumer-
Product Intensity 
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This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the interest spread, conditional on a 
borrower’s consumer-product intensity.  ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level 
respectively. ###, ##, # indicates that the difference across consumer-product intensity partitions is significant 
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Spread 
Variable Low Intensity High Intensity 
Media Sentiment -0.636** -1.0030*** 
 (0.327) (0.343)## 
   
Model OLS OLS 
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Y/I/P Y/I/P 
N 3,357 3,429 
R
2 
0.6580 0.7107 
 
 
 
 
